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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
SUPPLEMENTATION OF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : RECORD CITATIONS TO 
STATE'S OPENING BRIEF 
v. : 
GEORGE WALLACE, : No. 20050192-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
The State of Utah, by and through Kenneth A. Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, 
hereby supplements the State's opening brief with record citations, viz., page numbers 
assigned to paginated exhibits supplemented to the record following the filing of the State's 
opening brief, as follows: 
4 1st par. . . . the Wallaces owed them more than $450,000. R138:8,10; State's Ex. 3, 
R147-146. 
6 1st par. . . . but only the one for $301.24 cleared defendant's account. Rl 38:43-44; 
State's Ex. 4, Donald Horton's 1102 statement, Rl45-43. 
6 fn. 3 The "1102" statement of Donald Horton (State's Ex. 4, R145-431 bearing on 
counts 1 and 6 . . . . 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 18 2005 
9 1st par. ... and interest then owed. R138:72-73; State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, Ex. A and P.R184-181. 150. 
9 fh.4 . . . bearing on counts 4 and 10 (State's Ex. 2, R.187-148^ ) 
10 1st par. . . .a deficit totaling $51, 111. 13. Rl 00; State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, R150. 
10 2nd par. . . . by renting the estate. R138:72-73; State's Ex. 1, 1102 statement of 
Peggy Young, Trade winds' booking agent, R211. 208. 
10 2nd par. ...$8,000 a month beginning July 1,2002. Rl 38:15-16; State's Ex. 1,1102 
statement of Peggy Young, booking manager for Tradewinds, R208-207. 
10 fn. 5 The 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1, R216-
188) 
11 1st par. . . . plus a late fee, on the estate. State's Ex. 1, R211. 
11 1st par. . . . That check did not clear. State's Ex. 1, R211. 
11 1st par. . . . another individual's credit card. State's Ex. 1, R211. 
11 1st par. . . . for $3,096.84 to partially cover the first month's rent. State's Ex. 1, 
R211. 
11 ls,par. . . . was returned for insufficient funds. R138:15,17-19; State'sEx. 1, R211. 
11-12 . . . "Restitution/Victim List, was "fairly accurate." R138:30-32; State's Ex. 
3, R147-146. The list compiled the Wallaces indebtedness to numerous 
persons and entities, including victims of the charged offenses, totaling 
$457,379.79. State'sEx. 3.R147-146. 
18 2nd par. for $3,096.84 from the same account. R138:14, 17; State's Ex. 1, R211. 
That check, too, was returned for insufficient funds. Rl 38:17-18; State's Ex. 
1.R211. 
20 2nd par. entities in the amount of $457,379.79. Rl 38:30-32; State'sEx. 3.R147-146. 
20-21 delivered the check to Morris Murdock. State's Ex. 3, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, "Legal and Financial Report - 8/1/96 — 11/06/02, R185 and Ex. 
P, "Short Missed Payments," R150. In the preceding four and one-half years, 
the Wallaces missed or shorted payments in about 40 months. Id. At the 
2 
time of the bad check to Morris Murdock, the Wallaces owed the Stonelys 
over $50,000. R:100; State's Ex. 2, Ex. P, R150. 
22 1st par. . . . he expected to make a salary of $160,000 by November 2000. State's 
Ex. 2, Ex. B, R180-179. 
22 1st par. . . . from which he hoped to fully pay off his contract by October 1, 2001. 
H.R170. 
22 1st par. . . . we would be paid [and] to please be patient." State's Ex. 1 at p.l, R214. 
24 1st par. . . . the day after the check to Morris Murdock was written. See 1102 
statement of Peggy Stone, State's Ex. 1.R214. 
26 3rd par. The check was returned for insufficient funds. R138:17-18; State's Ex. 1, 
R214. [Delete "attached copy of check"] 
26 fn. 9 Peggy Young attested to being Tradewinds' booking agent. State's Ex. 1, 
1102 Statement of Peggy Young, R209. 
26 fn. 10 See Rental Agreement, attached to 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, 
Tradewinds' booking agent, State's Ex. 1 at p.4, R208. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2005. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Supplementation of 
Record Citations to the State's Opening Brief, was mailed, postage prepaid, to Margaret P. 
Lindsay, attorney for defendant, 99 East Center St., P.O. Box 1895, Provo, Utah 84059-1895, 
this 18th day of November, 2005. 
4 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Kelly v. State, 663 P.2d 967 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) 19 
Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. 1982) 29 
People v. District Court of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial District, 
803 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1990) 15 
People v. Jackson, 748 P.2d 1326 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) 20 
Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 110 P.3d 706 29 
State v. Clark,200l UT 9, 20 P.3d 300 2, 14, 15,25 
State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51,26 P.3d 223 15 
State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d425 (Utah App. 1997) 2 
State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994) 1 
State v. Jones, 336 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) 24 
State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983) 17,18, 19,24 
State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 P. 1065 (Utah 1924) 19 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) 14, 16 
State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, 44 P.3d 730 16 
State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998) 14 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (West 2004) 2,27 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004) 2,23 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (West 2004) 2, 18 
iii 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2004) 1,2, 16,26 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (West 2004) 2 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1603 (West 2004) 2 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 (West 2004) 2 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-1 (1999) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 29 29 
UtahR. Evid. 1102 2, 6 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 20050192-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a refusal to bind over on charges of theft by deception, a 
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 2004), and issuing 
a bad check, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) (West 
2004), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-
l(2)(a) (1999) and State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 54-55 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION, 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court incorrectly refused to bind over charges for theft by deception 
and passing a bad check where evidence amply showed that defendant knew the checks 
would not be paid? 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by the court's order dismissing the charges. 
R. 133-30. (A copy of the Order is contained in Addendum C.) 
Standard of Review. "[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over 
for trial presents a question of law," State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425,429 (Utah App. 1997), 
which is reviewed "without deference to the court below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, | 8, 
20P.3d300. 
STATUTES AND RULE 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505 (West 2004); 
Rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with theft by deception, a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405 (West 2004) (counts 6 and 7); 
communications fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1801 (West 2004) (counts 8 and 10), issuing a bad check, a third degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004) (count 9), and pattern of unlawful activity, 
a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (West 2004) (count 
11). R4-1.1 His wife, Deborah Wallace, was also charged with associated offenses (counts 
1
 The court's dismissal of charges against Deborah Wallace is the subject of a 
separate State's appeal, case number 20050190-CA. 
2 
1-5). A preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, acting as a 
magistrate under rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the court took the matter of 
bindover on all charges under advisement. R39-38; 138:81-83. Defendant moved to dismiss 
counts 6 through 8, 10, and 11. R50-43. Following a hearing, the court issued a 
memorandum decision wherein it concluded that the State had failed to establish every 
element of each of the charged offenses, including count 9, which the court dismissed sua 
sponte for lack of record evidence. R90-81, "Memorandum Decision" (Addendum B); Rl 40, 
transcript of October 19, 2004 hearing on defendant's motion ("dismissal hearing"). The 
prosecutor moved the court to reconsider. R108-93. The court issued a second memorandum 
decision wherein it concluded the State had not presented any argument to modify the court' s 
prior decision. R128-27. On January 31, 2005, the court issued its order dismissing all 
charges. Rl 33-29 ("Order") (Addendum C). The State timely filed a notice of appeal on 
February 24, 2005. R135. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In two and one-half years defendant and his wife wrote 254 checks on 
twelve bank accounts, aggregating to more than $450,000 
At the preliminary hearing, Toby O'Bryant, an investigator who had investigated 
about a hundred white-collar crimes, presented an overview of the prosecution's case. 
Rl38:5-27. He testified that on November 4, 2002, he met with eight individuals who had 
been "relieved of some money in one fashion or another [by the Wallaces], some by 
insufficient funds checks, some by borrowing the money and not paying it back as 
3 
promised." R138:5-8. These and other individuals and business entities claimed the 
Wallaces owed them more than $450,000. R138:8, 10; State's Ex. 3. Mr. O'Bryant 
subpoenaed fourteen bank accounts and looked at twelve of them. R138:9. Except for one 
of those accounts, all existed for only a year or two. Id, The Wallaces accumulated "a 
number of returned checks, overdraft and bank fees, and left deficits in closing amounts 
when [the accounts] were terminated by the banks." Id. The accounts were terminated 
involuntarily. R138:10. Between January 2000 and July 2002, the Wallaces wrote from 
those accounts 254 checks that were returned for insufficient funds. Rl38:9-10. 
Count 1 - Issuing a Bad Check - Deborah Wallace2 
Count 6 - Theft by Deception - George Wallace 
Edward Martinez had known the Wallaces, as neighbors in Springville, for about six 
or seven years at the time of the preliminary hearing, defendant having represented Mr. 
Martinez in custody matter concerning Mr. Martinet's father. R138:33-34. Shortly after that 
matter was concluded, defendant asked if Mr. Martinez he would lend him $10,000 for an 
investment defendant was working on. R138:34. On July 2, 2001, Mr. Martinez and his 
father-in-law, Donald Horton, met with defendant at defendant's home, and they each loaned 
him $10,000. R138:34-36. The note for the 90-day, twelve-percent (12%) loan required 
defendant to repay the principal, plus approximately $2,450, by September 30, 2001. 
2
 Facts related to charges against Deborah Wallace (count's 1-5) are set out as 
they are generally the same facts supporting defendant's charges. The State intends to 
move to consolidate the Wallaces' cases. Facts supporting counts 1 through 6, and 10 are 
relevant to this State's appeal of the court's refusal to bind defendant over on counts 7 
and 9. 
4 
Rl 3 8:36. Mr. Martinez received a promissory note and a pledge agreement in support of the 
transaction. Id. He also received a modified promissory note, directing defendant to pay an 
additional thirty percent (30%) if the note was not paid by sometime in February 2002. 
R13 8:3 6-3 7. Mr. Martinez trusted defendant out of defendant' s earlier association with him. 
R138:34. 
Defendant did not repay the loan by September 30. R138:37. When Mr. Martinez and 
Mr. Horton inquired about their money, defendant said that he had a "'big deal' ready to 
come through this Tuesday or Wednesday," at which point the Wallaces would have their 
money. Id. Defendant also asked Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton if they would extend the 
loan, but they declined. R138:37-38. Defendant failed to pay the loans by Tuesday or 
Wednesday. R138:38. At first, Mr. Martinez called the Wallaces on behalf of himself and 
Mr. Horton every other week, and later, every week. Id. Each time they received the same 
refrain: We have a "big deal" coming through and "[w]e should have your money for you by 
this next Tuesday or Wednesday." Id. 
On December 4, 2001, Mr. Martinez received a $10,000 check from the Wallaces. 
Id. He was still owed interest of $3,306.24. R138:38-39. 
On July 17, 2002, after trying to get the rest of their money back, the Martinezs and 
the Hortons happened to drive by the Wallaces' residence. Rl38:40. There they saw a 
moving van and an overseas or overland shipping container and people moving furniture. 
Id. Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton entered the house and asked the Wallaces what they were 
doing. R138:40-41. The Wallaces said they were moving to Hawaii. R138:41. Mr. 
5 
Martinez said he and Mr. Horton would like to get paid before the Wallaces left. Id. 
Deborah Wallace said, "That won't be a problem," and she wrote a check to Mr. Martinez 
for $3,000 and a check to Mr. Horton totaling $13,000. R138:41, 43. When Mr. Martinez 
noticed the interest on his check was short, Deborah Wallace wrote an additional check for 
$301.24. R138:42-43. The checks were dated, "July 17, 2002." Id. Deborah Wallace 
requested that they each not cash them until Tuesday or Wednesday because "[w]e should 
have plenty of money in there by Tuesday or Wednesday." Rl 38:41-42. Mr. Martinez and 
Mr. Horton agreed and did not try to cash the checks until July 22, as the Wallaces had 
requested. Id. On July 22, Mr. Martinez called the bank and learned that none of the checks 
would clear the account. Rl 38:42-43. Days later, on the advice of a police officer, Mr. 
Martinez and Mr. Horton deposited the checks, but only the one for $301.24 cleared 
defendant's account. R138:43-44; State's Ex. 4, Donald Horton's 1102 statement.3 Mr. 
Martinez acknowledged, on cross-examination, that defendant had repaid three prior loans 
Mr. Martinez made to him. R138:45. 
Mr. O'Bryant testified that the $13,000 check to Mr. Horton was written on an Far 
West account belonging to Imi Kaimana Investments, LLC, on which defendant was the only 
endorser. Rl 3 8:11-12. The account never had funds close to $ 13,000, either before or after 
3
 Rule 1102 (8), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides for the admission of reliable 
hearsay consisting "of a statement of a declarant that is written . . . , (A) under oath . . . or 
affirmation; or (B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made 
therein is punishable." Utah R. Evid. 1102 (a), -(b)(8). The "1102" statement of Donald 
Horton (State's Ex. 4), bearing on counts land 6, was received by the court without 
objection. R40; 138:44. 
6 
itwas written. R138:12. The account was involuntarily closed on August 12,2002, less than 
a month after the check was written. Id. 
Count 2 - Issuing a Bad Check - Deborah Wallace 
Count 7 - Theft by Deception - George Wallace 
On the morning of July 18,2002, Deborah Wallace called Sharon Warner at her home 
in Springville, from which she worked for Morris Murdock Travel ("Morris Murdock"). 
R138:46-48. Deborah Wallace asked Ms. Warner to gether eleven tickets for flights the next 
day to Hawaii. R138:47. In response to Ms. Warner's surprise about the late call, Deborah 
Wallace said she had already made arrangements herself with Pleasant Hawaii Holidays. 
However, she did not have a credit card, and because of the last-minute arrangements, Ms. 
Warner, "with Morris behind [her], would have the clout" to expedite the ticket arrangement, 
and she wanted Ms. Warner to receive the commission, about $1500. Rl 38:47-48. Ms. 
Warner, with Morris's vice president's approval, agreed, and asked for cash. R138:48. Ms. 
Wallace said she did not have the money at that point, but that she would on Tuesday. Id. 
Ms. Wallace then requested that Ms. Warner take a check and post-date it to the coming 
Tuesday. Id. Early that afternoon, both defendant and Deborah Wallace and delivered a 
check for $11,496.30, and thanked her with a "big hug." R138:49. The Wallaces left the 
next day. Rl38:52. 
Although the check was actually dated "July 17," Ms. Warner did not try to cash it 
until Tuesday. Rl 38:49. When she called the bank, she learned that there were insufficient 
funds to cover the check. Id. Ms. Warner waited another day or two and then called 
7 
Deborah Wallace on her cell phone in Hawaii. R138:49-50. When Ms. Warner expressed 
her concern, Wallace said, "Oh, the money is coming any time. Just hold off a few more 
days." R138:50. Ms. Warner reported, "This went on for several weeks" and always with 
the same refrain: "[S]ome money is coming . . . and it was always a big amount. . . that 
would cover this." R138:50-51. Although she usually spoke with Deborah Wallace, Ms. 
Warner thought that Ms. Wallace sometimes spoke with defendant during their conversations 
and that she spoke with defendant directly at least one time. Id. At some point, Ms. Warner 
deposited the check, and it was returnedfor insufficient funds. R138:50. 
Lynette Ambrose, a paralegal in Morris Murdock's legal department, spoke frequently 
with Deborah Wallace in trying to collect on the check. Rl 38:53-54. Although most of her 
telephone conversations were with Deborah Wallace, she sometimes heard defendant assist 
Deborah in answering her questions. Rl38:54. The Wallaces also made out two more 
checks, totaling $ 1,860, to Morris Meetings, a subsidiary of Morris Murdock, for admission 
fees to a Nu Skin convention. Id. Both of those checks "bounced." Id. At the time of the 
preliminary hearing, the Wallaces still owed Morris Murdock $14,196.30. Id. 
Mr. O'Bryant testified that the check to Morris Murdock was written on a different 
Far West account owned by Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC, a similar sounding account to 
Imi Kaimana Investments. R138:13-14. That check was for $11,496.30. Id. There was 
never enough money in that account to cover the check "[b]y a large margin—[t]housands 
of dollars." R138:15. 
8 
Count 4 - Communications Fraud - Deborah Wallace 
Count 10 - Communications Fraud - George Wallace 
In 1996, Jeanne Stonely and her husband sold their house in Springville to the 
Wallaces on a contract. R138:71-72. The schedule of payments, prepared by defendant, set 
out monthly payments of $1,663.78, beginning in September 1997, which would gradually 
increase to $2,148.49 by August 1, 2001, at which time defendant promised to pay off all 
principal and interest then owed. R138:72-73; State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 
statement, Ex. A and P.4 
The Wallaces began to fall short on their payments in September 1997. R138:73. 
After the Wallaces failed to pay anything for several months, Ms. Stonely contacted them. 
Id, Because Ms. Stonely trusted the Wallaces, she constantly "fell prey" to their explanations 
and claims that her money would be forthcoming. Id, Eventually, the Stonelys, who were 
then in Canada, sent the Wallaces a demand letter, which was never acknowledged. 
R138:74. The Wallaces had apparently left the house, but left no forwarding address. Id, 
The Stonelys, however, still had the Wallaces' cell phone number. Whenever they spoke, 
either Deborah Wallace or defendant would promise that the money was forthcoming. Id, 
However, because the Wallaces were short on their payments, the Stonelys could not make 
their mortgage payments. Id, "The pressure was on," and the Stonelys needed to regain 
possession of the house. Id, The Stonelys hired an attorney and regained possession of the 
house by receiving a warranty deed from the Wallaces. Rl38:74-75. 
4
 The 1102 statement of Jeanne Stonely, bearing on counts 4 and 10 (State's Ex. 2) was 
received without objection. R40; 138:19-20. 
9 
The Stonelys incurred other expenses after receiving the warranty deed. Rl38:75. 
The Stonelys changed the locks and engaged a realtor to sell the house. Id. The Wallaces 
did not leave the house in good condition, and it needed a great deal of cleaning and repairs 
for wear-and-tear, costing between $700 and $800. Rl 3 8:75-76. The yard needed attention, 
and Ms. Stonely paid her children to take care of it. R138:75. Although she was not sure 
that the warranty deed explicitly addressed the matter, she and the Wallaces understood that 
she would forgive the Wallaces' outstanding debt on the house if the house was left in good 
condition. Rl38:76. She also paid $3,000 in back taxes accrued by the Wallaces over four 
years. Id. Between September 1997 and April 2002, the Wallaces missed eighteen payments 
entirely and where short on twenty-two payments, a deficit totaling $51,111.13. R100; 
State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 statement. 
Count 9 - Issuing a bad check - George Wallace 
The Tradewinds Estate ("Tradewinds") is owned by Mr. David Thielen, who does 
business under the name of the Tradewinds by renting the estate. State's Ex. 1, 1102 
statement of Peggy Young, Tradewinds' booking agent.5 Mr. O'Bryant testified that in 
March 2002, the Wallaces began negotiations with Tradewinds to rent the estate on the 
island of Oahu in Hawaii. Rl 3 8:15. Under a contract, defendant signed a rental agreement, 
dated June 17,2002, to rent the estate for $8,000 a month beginning July 1,2002. Rl 3 8:15-
16; State's Ex. 1, 1102 statement of Peggy Young, booking manager for Tradewinds. 
5
 The 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1) was 
received without objection. R40; 138:18-19. 
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Deborah Wallace wrote a check for $8,500 to Tradewinds to cover the initial deposit, plus 
a late fee, on the estate. State's Ex. L That check did not clear. State's Ex. 1. Deborah 
Wallace wired $7,500 to Tradewinds and covered the remaining deposit and late fee with 
another individual's credit card.6 State's Ex. 1. Thereafter, on July 19, 2002, defendant 
wrote a check to Tradewinds for $3,096.84 to partially cover the first month's rent. State's 
Ex. 1. That check too, the basis for count 9, was returned for insufficient funds. Rl 38:15, 
17-19; State's Ex. 1. A rental fee of $14,250 was still owed on the estate even after the 
Wallaces later wired approximately $8,000 to Tradewinds. Rl38:25-26. 
Prosecutorial judgment that Wallace's acted criminally 
From his investigation, Mr. O 'Bryant considered that the Wallaces should be charged 
criminally and that their activities should not be regarded as isolated instances of a bad 
checks and unfortunate circumstances that should have been handled civilly: 
[T]he volume of complaint was one matter that concerned me greatly. This 
wasn't just a mistake here and there, a dropped decimal point or a 
miscalculation in a checkbook. This was an overall long-term pattern of 
development through 12 accounts of juggling monies, moving one temporarily 
into one to pay for something that didn't exist. There was just not enough 
money in any of those accounts to do the kinds of things they were doing 
financially. 
R138:20. From what Mr. O'Bryant could tell from the accounts he examined, he thought 
the Wallaces were living well beyond their means. Id. The Wallaces also personally 
admitted to Mr. O'Bryant that a "Restitution/Victim List, was "fairly accurate." R138:30-
6
 Deborah and George Wallace were individually charged with communications 
fraud against Catryna Faux and her husband based on credit advances made to the 
Wallaces while the two couples were in Hawaii. R3-2; 138:55-70; State's Ex. 5. 
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32; State's Ex. 3. The list compiled the Wallaces indebtedness to numerous persons and 
entities, including victims of the charged offenses, totaling $457,379.79. State's Ex. 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate incorrectly refused to bind defendant over on the theft by deception 
charge based on defendant's issuing a bad check to Morris Murdock (Count 7). The 
magistrate failed to view the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from that 
evidence most favorably to the prosecution. The evidence showed that defendant assisted 
his wife in obtaining tickets from Morris Murdock to Hawaii, which he used. The evidence 
also showed that defendant obtained the tickets by deception—knowing that the check for 
the tickets would not be paid. Defendant issued other bad checks just before and after he 
delivered the check at issue to Morris Murdock. At the time he delivered the check to Morris 
Murdock, he was in extreme financial distress: Defendant and his wife were still issuing 
insufficient funds checks, after having issued hundreds of bad checks in the preceding two 
and one-half years; all of defendant's bank accounts reviewed by a State 
investigator—twelve accounts—were soon involuntarily closed; and defendant admitted that 
he owed his creditors over $450,000. Defendant's deceptiveness was also evidenced by a 
constant refrain of "big deals" emerging with promises that payment would shortly be made. 
All of this evidence provided sufficient probable cause to bind defendant over on theft by 
deception. 
The magistrate also incorrectly refused to bind defendant over on the charge of issuing 
a bad check to Tradewinds (Count 9). The magistrate found that he "was not given sufficient 
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facts to determine the nature of this charge." In fact, the prosecution and its principal witness 
specifically directed the magistrate's attention at the preliminary hearing to count 9. 
Defendant wrote the check for the right to contemporaneously rent an estate, a fact supported 
not only by the witness's testimony, but by the sworn statement of Tradewinds' booking 
agent. The check was indisputably returned for insufficient funds. The record clearly 
reflects that the check to Tradewinds was written from the same account, only one day later, 
on which the $11,496.30 check to Morris Murdock was written. Based on the severe 
financial straits defendant then faced, his history of writing bad checks, and his repeated 
lulling statements to Tradewinds, the magistrate should have found ample facts to bind 
defendant over. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO BIND OVER 
DEFENDANT ON CHARGES THAT HE COMMITTED THEFT BY 
DECEPTION AGAINST MORRIS MURDOCK AND ISSUED A BAD 
CHECK TO TRADEWINDS WHERE THE EVIDENCE AND ITS 
INFERENCES SUPPORTED A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT 
DEFENDANT KNEW CHECKS TO BOTH VICTIMS WOULD NOT BE 
PAID 
Defendant was charged with two counts of theft by deception (counts 6 and 7), two 
counts of communications fraud (counts 8 and 10), one count of issuing a bad check (count 
9), and one count of pattern of unlawful activity (count 11). R4-1. After all parties 
submitted memoranda, and after a hearing, the magistrate dismissed all charges. R80-81, 
133-30. The State does not dispute the magistrate's dismissal of Count 6 (promising 
repayment to Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton), count 8 (devising a scheme to defraud the 
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Fauxs), count 10 (devising a scheme to defraud the Stonelys), and count 11 (pattern of 
unlawful activity). As explained below, however, the reasonable inferences arising from the 
evidence established a "reasonable belief that defendant committed all the elements of theft 
by deception on Morris Murdock (count 7) and issuing a bad check to Tradewinds (count 9). 
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over on these charges should therefore be 
reversed. 
A. The Bindover Standard. 
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause5 at a 
preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it/" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 
10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (additional 
internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,437 
(Utah 1998). Thus, "to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must. . . produce 
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 15 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a 
bindover is the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at \ 16. Under both 
standards, the prosecution must only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
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In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant 
committed each element of the charged offense, "[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the prosecution." Id, at f 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f^ 3, 26 P.3d 223 
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution"). "[W]hen faced with 
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave 
those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
"It is not for the trial judge at a preliminary hearing to accept the defendant's version of the 
facts over the legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the [State's] evidence." People 
v. District Court of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial District, 803 P.2d 193,196 (Colo. 1990) 
(en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives 
rise to alternative reasonable inferences, the magistrate must choose those inferences that 
support the State's case. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ j 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence 
gave rise to two alternate inferences - one suggesting innocence and the other guilt - viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, evidence supported probable cause); see 
also Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51,^ } 13 ("Although defendants' characterizations of the facts may 
also be plausibly inferred from the evidence, there are clearly factual issues that must be 
resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate the reasonable inferences presented by the 
State"). In short, "'unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim,' the magistrate 
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should bind the defendant over for trial." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz v. 
Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)) (brackets in original); accord State v. Schroyer, 
2002 UT 26 , f l0 , 44 P.3d 730. 
B. The magistrate failed to properly apply the bindover 
standard to the charge that defendant committed theft 
by deception against Morris Murdock. 
L The evidence established probable cause that defendant 
knew the check to Morris Murdock (count 7) would not be paid. 
To meet the bindover requirement in this case, the State was required to present 
evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that defendant knew that the $ 11,496.30 
check to Morris Murdock would not be paid. 
"A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405(1) 
(West 2004). 
The evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to establish 
probable cause that defendant obtained or exercised control over Morris Murdock's property 
with a purpose to deprive it of that property. "Property" is anything of value." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-401(1) (West 2004). '"Purpose to deprive5 means to have the conscious object 
. . . to use [the property] under such circumstances that a substantial portion of. . . the use 
and benefit[] would be lost." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-40l(3)(a) (West 2004). 
George and Deborah Wallace obtained from Morris Murdock airline tickets for 
themselves and others to Hawaii in exchange for the $11,496.30 check they gave to Sharon 
Warner, Morris Murdock's agent. R138:46-47, 49, 54. The Wallaces used the tickets the 
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next day. Rl38:52. Thus, the Wallaces obtained control over Morris Murdock's property 
with a purpose to deprive Morris Murdock of the property. See State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 
1061, 1063 (Utah 1983) (concluding that the defendant, who obtained clothing samples by 
issuing a check later returned for insufficient funds, obtained property with purpose to 
deprive, albeit not by deception). 
The evidence was also sufficient to establish probable cause that defendant obtained 
control of the tickets by deception. 
"'Deception5 occurs when a person intentionally... [pjromises performance that is 
likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, which performance the actor . . . 
knows will not be performed[.] UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401(5)(e)(l) (West 2004). "A 
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result or his conduct when he 
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
103(2) (West 2004). 
Here, there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant knew 
that there would not be enough money in the account on which the check to Morris Murdock 
was drawn to be paid only a few days later. On July 18, 2002, Deborah Wallace made a 
check to Morris Murdock for $11,496.30. R138:13-14.7 The check was drawn on the 
account of "Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC" at Far West Bank. R138:13-14. The check was 
dated July 17, 2002. R138:49. Deborah had told Ms. Warner earlier in the day, however, 
7
 There is no direct evidence that Deborah Wallace signed the check. However, 
the prosecutor's references that it was "her check" and that she was charged with issuing 
a bad check are not disputed. R58, 103. 
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that presently there were not sufficient funds in the account and asked Ms. Warner to hold 
the check until the following Tuesday, July 23. Rl38:48. Later that day, Deborah and 
defendant delivered the check to Ms. Warner. R138:49. When Ms. Warner called the bank 
on Tuesday, she was informed that there were not sufficient funds to cover the check. Id, 
When she deposited the check sometime later, it was returned for insufficient funds. 
R138.-50.8 
"[FJailure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of intent or 
knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40l(5)(e) (West 2004). Here, however, 
there was substantial "other evidence" that defendant knew the check would not clear on 
Tuesday. Mr. O'Bryant, the State's investigator, testified that there was never enough money 
in the Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC account to cover the check "[b]y a large 
margin—[t]housands of dollars." R138:15. Further, defendant knowingly diminished any 
likelihood that the check to Morris Murdock might clear by writing a check the following 
day, July 19, to Tradewinds for $3,096.84 from the same account. R138:14,17; State's Ex. 
1. That check, too, was returned for insufficient funds. R138:17-18; State's Ex. 1. In light 
8
 Any argument that the check to Morris Murdock was a promise to pay a past 
debt, and therefore insufficient to form the basis of a charge of theft by deception, is 
without merit. See Lakey, 659 P.2d at 1063-64 (observing that although issuing a check 
to a payee who understood it was to held for some time before cashing it was not criminal 
under the bad check statute, such limitation did not apply to theft by deception, where 
section 76-6-40 l(5)(e) specifically made criminal a promise the actor "knows will not be 
performed") (citations omitted). 
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this evidence, defendant would have been "reasonably certain" that the check would not clear 
on Tuesday, July 23. 
Evidence that the Wallaces were in extreme financial straits at the time defendant 
delivered the check to Ms. Warner further supports that defendant knew he did not have the 
capacity to fulfill the promise that the check to Morris Murdock would clear by Tuesday, July 
23. "The very kernel of the principle (either knowledge or intent) is that the fact of the 
uttering [a forged check] tends, in one way or another, to show the defendant's knowledge 
at the time in issue, either by the probable warning received, or by the improbability of 
innocent intent in repeated instances', and the assumption throughout is that the bare fact of 
utterance shows this." State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 P. 1065, 1066-67 (Utah 1924) 
(emphasis added). 
Over the preceding two and one-half years, 254 checks issued by the Wallaces were 
returned for insufficient funds. R138:9-10. These checks support that defendant was 
reasonably certain that the check issued to Morris Murdock would also not be paid. See 
Lakey, 659 P.2d at 1064 (noting that testimony that previously passed bad checks supported 
that the defendant was reasonably certain that the check at issue would not clear, but that this 
evidence was not sufficient to support conviction for theft by deception in light of contrary 
evidence); Lanos, 63 Utah 151,223 P. at 1066-67 (evidence of the defendant's passing two 
uncharged forged checks, even without knowledge that they were forged, was relevant to 
prove the defendant's guilty knowledge that he passed a forged check in the instant case); 
Kelly v. State, 663 P.2d 967, 972 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (evidence of contemporaneously 
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issued bad checks admissible to prove intent or absence of mistake concerning charged 
check); People v. Jackson, 748 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (same). 
Further supporting that defendant knew the check to Morris Murdock would not be 
paid was Deborah Wallace's contemporaneous issuance of two bad checks to Martinez and 
Horton. In defendant's immediate presence, she wrote one check to Mr. Martinez for $3,000 
and another one to Mr. Horton for $13,000. The checks were written on July 17, one day 
before the bad check to Morris Murdock was written. R:R138:13-14, 41,43. Although the 
checks were written on a different account at Far West Bank, the Imi Kaimana Investment, 
LLC account, "there was never anything close to $13,000 in that account either before or 
after that check was written . . ." R138:11-12. That account was involuntarily closed less 
than a month after the check to Morris Murdock was written. R138:12. Every one of the 
twelve accounts of the Wallaces that Mr. O'Bryant investigated was involuntarily closed. 
R:138:9-10. The Wallaces admitted that the State's "Restitution/Victim List," "fairly 
accurately]" showed that they were indebted to at least twenty individuals or entities in the 
amount of $457,379.79. R138:30-32; State's Ex. 3. 
In addition to contemporaneously written bad checks and a recent history of hundreds 
of bad checks, defendant could no longer make payments on the house he purchased from 
the Stonelys at the time he delivered the check to Morris Murdock. Defendant made no 
payments from May 2002 through November 28, 2002, when he deeded the house back to 
the Stonelys and the period in which he delivered the check to Morris Murdock. State's Ex. 
3, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 statement, "Legal and Financial Report - 8/1/96 — 11/06/02 and 
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Ex. P, "Short Missed Payments." In the preceding four and one-half years, the Wallaces 
missed or shorted payments in about 40 months. Id. At the time of the bad check to Morris 
Murdock, the Wallaces owed the Stonelys over $50,000. R:100; State's Ex. 2, Ex. P. 
Finally, Deborah and George Wallace's constant litany of big deals coming to fruition 
and promises to pay their creditors "by Tuesday," when, in fact, the purported funds rarely 
materialized to support their promises, is strong circumstantial evidence that defendant knew 
that by the time he delivered the check to Morris Murdock, it would not be paid. See Kollar 
v. State, 556 N.E.2d 936, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (conviction for theft by false pretenses 
supported by pattern of repeated promises of delivery of goods to multiple victims, followed 
by lulling purchasers with excuses for failure to perform long after the defendant should have 
been aware that his business was failing); Baker v. State, 588 So.2d 945, 948 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1991) (affirming conviction for theft by deception based on intent to defraud on failure 
to perform promises in similar instances and subsequent evasive conduct and delaying 
tactics). 
Here, long after the date on which the bad check to Morris Murdock would 
purportedly clear, Deborah Wallace repeatedly told Ms. Warner that a large amount of money 
was coming in and that she should just hold off a few more days. R138:50-51. Although she 
usually spoke with Deborah Wallace, Ms. Warner thought that Wallace sometimes spoke 
with defendant during their conversations and that she spoke with defendant directly at least 
one time. Id. Defendant repeatedly put off Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton for months with 
claims that he was expecting a "big deal" to come through and that "[w]e should have your 
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money for you by this next Tuesday or Wednesday." R: 138:37. Defendant put off the 
Stonelys for months with promises of performance, claiming that large projects were coming 
to fruition, while he repeatedly missed or sent short payments on the house for months and 
years afterward. He claimed in an email sent to Jeanne Stonely on September 19,2000 that 
he had two big projects in the pipeline in which his interest was worth hundreds of thousands 
of dollars and that he expected to make a salary of $160,000 by November 2000. State's Ex. 
2, Ex. B. He emailed Ms. Stonely on May 7, 2001, asserting that he had a partnership 
interest worth $ 1,800,000 in one project and that he had interests worth $80,000 in two other 
deals in progress. Id. In another email, dated August 8,2001, defendant claimed that he had 
accepted a job as president of a division of Security National Mortgage, which would pay a 
large salary, plus bonus, from which he hoped to fully pay off his contract by October 1, 
2001. Id. Similarly, the Wallaces put off Ms. Stone, Tradewinds' booking agent, after 
defendant's check was returned for insufficient funds: "Just continual telephone 
conversations about how funds were being processed from their many ventures and that we 
would be paid [and] to please be patient." State's Ex. 1 at p.l. 
None of defendant's purported expectations produced any payments to his victims, 
nor did any proceeds from his purported ventures protect his bank accounts from 
involuntarily closures. In sum, there was substantial "other evidence" supporting a 
reasonable belief that defendant knew with "reasonable certainty" that the check he delivered 
to Morris Murdock would not clear the following Tuesday. 
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2. Viewed favorably to the prosecution, the undisputed evidence 
showed that defendant requested, encouraged, and aided his wife 
to obtain tickets from Morris Murdoch. 
The sole reason that the magistrate refused to bind defendant over on the theft by 
deception charge is that it found that "[t]he evidence at the preliminary hearing established 
that Ms. Warner, an employee of Murdock Travel, dealt exclusively with the Defendant's 
wife and not with the Defendant." See Memorandum Decision, R86 (Addendum B). The 
magistrate's memorandum decision and its order of dismissal may also be plainly read to 
mean that the magistrate concluded that the State failed to show that defendant committed 
all the elements of theft by deception and that Ms. Warner dealt only with Deborah Wallace. 
R86, 132. However, as discussed below, defendant was guilty of theft by deception when 
he encouraged and aided his wife to commit acts constituting that offense, as the prosecutor 
argued. R138:49-51. 
"Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense 
. . . who . . . requests, . . . encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (West 2004). 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor clearly developed the theory that defendant 
acted as his wife's accomplice when he specifically elicited from Ms. Warner that defendant 
had accompanied his wife in delivering the check and had subsequently assisted her in lulling 
Ms. Warner and Ms. Ambrose. R138:49-51, 53-54. Ms. Warner testified that 
[Deborah and George Wallace] came to my house . . . and brought me this 
check for 11,400-whatever and gave me a big hug and said, "Thank you. We 
23 
really appreciate this. We owe you tickets to Hawaii. We 'II get you over there 
to see us sometime." 
Rl38:49 (emphasis added). This report virtually states that defendant knew that Morris 
Murdock had done him a great favor by providing tickets in exchange for a check that was 
not then backed by sufficient funds. The magistrate's refusal to bind over defendant because 
Ms. Warner spoke only with Deborah Wallace in the earlier stages of this transaction misses 
defendant's obvious participation. It is undisputed that defendant and his wife were packing 
for Hawaii the day before they delivered the check to Ms. Warner. Rl38:40-41. It is 
undisputed that he wrote a contemporaneous check to Tradewinds to cover the rent for the 
Hawaii estate they occupied the day after the check to Morris Murdock was written. See 
1102 statement of Peggy Stone, State's Ex. 1. Drawing the inferences from these facts most 
favorably to the prosecution, the magistrate should have concluded that defendant 
encouraged, probably requested, and definitely aided his wife to obtain the tickets from Ms. 
Warner. See State v. Jones, 336 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that 
the defendant's acquaintance with his codefendant provided evidence of the total picture 
"from which it was reasonable to infer that [the] defendant had knowledge of the 
[incriminating] items [possessed by the codefendant]"). 
Given that the check to Morris Murdock was not yet good, its delivery could only 
have meant that it was a promise to pay in the future. As set forth at length in the preceding 
section and in contradistinction to the magistrate's conclusion, defendant must also have been 
"reasonably certain" that this promise would not be kept. See Lakey, 659 P.2d 1063-64 (theft 
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by deception includes promise of future performance which actor knows will not be 
performed). 
In sum, cview[ing] all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and 
. . . draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution/' the magistrate 
incorrectly refused to bind over defendant when the State produced sufficient evidence to 
support a reasonable belief that defendant committed theft by deception. See Clark, 2001 UT 
9 ^ 1 0 . 
C. The magistrate failed to properly apply the bindover standard to the 
charge that defendant issued a bad check to Tradewinds (count 9). 
The magistrate, sua sponte, refused to bind defendant over on count 9, which charged 
defendant with issuing a bad check to Tradewinds. See Memorandum Decision, R82 
(Addendum B), and Order, Rl 31 (Addendum C). The magistrate dismissed this charge, after 
making these findings: 
This issue was not raised in either the State's or the 
Defendant's motion, and was not discussed at oral arguments. 
The Court was not given sufficient facts to determine the nature 
of this charge. 
R131. 
The magistrate's findings are clearly erroneous, and its refusal to bind defendant over 
on this charge is incorrect. Count 9 was not discussed by the parties because defendant did 
not move to dismiss it. R50-44. The logical response of the magistrate in the absence of 
defendant's motion to dismiss should have been to bind defendant over, if there were 
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sufficient facts to support the bindover. Contrary to the magistrate's order, there were 
sufficient facts to bind defendant over for issuing a bad check. 
"Any person who issues or passes a check . . . for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person . . . any . . . property[] or other thing of value . . . 
knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of 
issuing a bad check or draft." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505 (1) (West 2004). 
To meet the bindover requirement in this case, the State was required to present 
evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that defendant knew that the $3,096.84 
check to Tradewinds would not be paid. 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor directed Mr. 0'Bryant to count 9: "Let's 
look at the next bad check count, Count 9 . . . . This is the Peggy Young count. As alleged 
in the Information, bad check on or about July 19th of 2002."9 R138:15. Mr. O'Bryant then 
explained that George Wallace wrote a check to Tradewinds for $3,096.84 in a course of 
dealing to rent an estate in Hawaii. Rl38:15-17. Defendant wrote the check on July 19, 
2002, to cover the rent for the remainder of July.10 The check was returned for insufficient 
funds. R138:17-18; State's Ex. 1, attached copy of check. Thus, the evidence received by 
9
 Peggy Young attested to being Tradewinds' booking agent. State's Ex. 1, 1102 
Statement of Peggy Young. 
10
 The Wallaces were to occupy the estate beginning July 20, 2002. See Rental 
Agreement, attached to 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, Tradewinds' booking agent, 
State's Ex. 1 at p.4. From and including July 20 through July 3lis 12 days. The monthly 
rent was $8,000. Id. Thus, defendant's check was to pay rent through the remainder of 
the month: 12/31 x $8,000 - $3,096.77. 
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the magistrate amply showed defendant wrote a bad check for the purpose of receiving 
something of value from Tradewinds, use of the estate from July 19 through July 31. As with 
the theft by deception charge (count 7), the only remaining question was whether defendant 
knew the check would not be paid. 
There was ample evidence to show that defendant knew, viz., that defendant was 
"reasonably certain," that the check would not be paid. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (2) 
(West 2004) (defining "knowingly); See Br. Aple. at 18-19. O 'Bryant testified that the check 
was written on "the 1245 account." The 1245 account had been identified to the magistrate 
moments earlier as the "Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC" account. R138:12. The 1245 
account was the same account from which "the $11,000 check," had been written to Morris 
Murdock, a fact O'Bryant also reminded the magistrate of. R138:18. As Mr. O'Bryant 
remarked concerning the status of the Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC account from which 
the bad check to Morris Murdock was written on July 18, there was never enough money in 
that account to cover that check "[b]y a large margin—[tjhousands of dollars." R138:15. 
As argued in connection with the theft by deception charge against Morris Murdock (count 
7), defendant knew on July 18, 2002 that the Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC did not then 
have sufficient funds to pay the check at issue. Aple. Br. at 19-23. The contemporaneous 
check defendant delivered to Morris Murdock assured that the $3,096.84 check to 
Tradewinds would not be paid. Additionally, from the foregoing discussion of the financial 
straits defendant was presently in, his long history of writing bad checks, and repeated lulling 
statements made not only to his other victims, but also to Ms. Stone, the magistrate should 
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have recognized that defendant knew his check to Tradewinds was reasonably certain not to 
be paid. 
In sum, the magistrate erred in refusing to bind defendant over on the charge that 
defendant wrote a bad check to Tradewinds. The prosecution produced ample evidence to 
support a reasonable belief that defendant obtained the right to occupy Tradewinds' property 
by writing a check that he was reasonably certain would not be paid. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over and dismissing the felony 
information against on charges of theft by deception (count 7) and issuing a bad check (count 
9) should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding defendant over for 
trial on those charges. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process/' Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 




Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Margaret P. Lindsay, attorney for defendant, 99 East Center 
St., P.O. Box 1895, Provo, Utah 84059-1895, this 19th day of September, 2005. 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 76-2-103. Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result 
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person 
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
§ 76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of 
another 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
§ 76-6-401. Definitions 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal 
property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments or other writings 
representing or embodying rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or 
otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such 
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or 
any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or 
invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of possession or of some 
other legally recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to 
labor or services, to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, 
would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will 
recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct 
heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by 
conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously created or confirmed 
by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not 
now believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; 
or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, security interest, 
adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record; 
or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, 
however, that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of intent or 
knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed. 
§ 76-6-405. Theft by deception 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters having no 
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group 
addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications 
addressed to the public or to a class or group. 
§ 76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft—Presumption 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the purpose 
of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other 
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid 
by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for which payment is 
refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if he had no 
account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the purpose 
of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other 
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or 
draft is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to make 
good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused check or draft within 14 days 
of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less than $300, the offense is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the 
offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the 
offense is a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree 
felony. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 1102. RELIABLE HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 
(a) Statement of the Rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations. 
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary examinations only, 
reliable hearsay includes: 
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, regardless 
of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary examination; 
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any exhibit; 
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records; 
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records; 
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer; 
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense which is promptly 
reported by the child victim and recorded in accordance with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; 
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed verbatim which is: 
(A) under oath or affirmation; or 
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made therein is punishable. 
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of admissibility at trial 
under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay evidence is proffered or 
admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the hearing may be granted for the 
purpose of furnishing additional evidence if: 
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is not sufficient and 
additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly disadvantaged by the 
use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests of the declarant and the efficient 




Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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GEORGE AND DEBORAH WALLACE, 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 031403946; 031403-948 
Date: November 30,2004 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed and 
considered all relevant memoranda and hearings, now makes the following ruling: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Counts 1-5 of the Information apply to Defendant, Deborah Wallace. 
2. Counts 6-11 of the Information apply to Defendant, George Wallace. 
3. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 1 with issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, for 
a check that was written to Don Horton in the amount of $13,000 and for a $3,000 check 
written to Edward Martinez. These checks were written on July 17, 2002. Mrs. Wallace 
told both Mr. Horton and Martinez that her account lacked sufficient funds and instructed 
them to wait a few days before cashing the checks, as she was expecting sufficient funds 
to be deposited into her account. However, when the gentlemen attempted to cash the 
checks, there was insufficient funds. 
4. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 2, issuing a bad check, and Mr. Wallace, theft by 
deception, for a check written by Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel in the amount 
of approximately $11,000 on July 18, 2002. The check was dated July 17, 2002, and Mr. 
Wallace asked the agent, Sharon Warner, to not cash the check for a few days because 
there was not sufficient funds in the account that the check was drawn on, but that 
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sufficient funds were expected to arrive from a business deal. However, the sufficient 
funds did not arrive and the check did not clear. 
5. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 3 and Mr. Wallace in Count 8 for Communication 
Fraud, which involves a transaction between Mrs. Wallace and Catryna Faux. Mrs. Faux 
performed housekeeping services and Mrs. Wallace still owed her about $1,063 in back 
wages. Mrs. Faux testified that while she lived in Springville, Utah she had loaned 
money to Mrs. Wallace on three separate occasions. The first two loans were repaid, but 
the third one, amounting to $1,129.32 was not repaid. Mrs. Faux and her husband then 
voluntarily traveled with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace to Hawaii, with the promise of jobs. 
While in Hawaii the Wallaces borrowed additional money from the Fauxs. 
6. In September 2002, the Wallaces persuaded the Fauxs to attend a NuSkin convention in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Wallaces told the Fauxs that they would pay them $6,000 
when they arrived at the convention, based upon monies the Wallaces were expected to 
receive. When the Fauxs arrived in Utah, they learned the Wallaces did not receive the 
funds and "that it was a big mess." Whereupon the Fauxs moved back to Utah, as they 
could not afford to remain in Hawaii. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that 
"I know [the Wallaces] felt bad about not getting the money, and [Mrs. Wallace], you 
know, in good will, said, 'We'll pay you back for those expenses.5" PLH Trans, at 67. 
7. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 4 and Mr. Wallace in Count 10 for Communication 
Fraud. These charges stem from a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. The 
Wallaces and the Stonelys entered into a contract for the sale of the Stonelys' home. 
However, the defendants became delinquent in payments between September of 1997 and 
June of 2002. In addition, the defendants also failed to pay property taxes. The Wallaces 
were delinquent in the amount of $57,714.40. As a result of the delinquency, the 
Wallaces signed a warranty deed, deeding the property back to the Stonelys "in payment 
of all monies owing." PLH Trans, at 75. 
8. Mrs. Wallace is charged with Count 5 and Mr. Wallace with Count 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, to include all other creditors that were not repaid by the Wallaces. 
9. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 6, theft by deception, for an agreement he entered into 
with Mr, Horton. Mr. Horton loaned the defendant $10,000 to make an investment. The 
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defendant was unable to repay Mr. Horton the principal or interest when the amount came 
due. 
10. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 9, issuing a bad check. However, the State fails to 
provide the Court with sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge. 
1L The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was conducted on April 7, 2004, after which the 
Court took the issue of binding over the charges under advisement and to allow counsel 
to brief the issue. 
12. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, whereupon the State filed a motion in 
opposition. Oral Arguments were held on October 19, 2004. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is "ferreting out. . . groundless and improvident 
prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 504 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (2004). In order to bind a defendant 
over at a preliminary hearing, the Court must find that there is probable cause sufficient to 
establish the "crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." Id. 
(citations omitted), "In making a determination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the 
prosecution." Id. "The defendant should be bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim." Id. The State must present a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 
1995)(citation omitted). 
I. Count 1, issuing a bad check, is dismissed because the checks were not written for value. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check for events arising out of 
checks that were written to Mr. Horton and Mr. Martinez on July 17, 2002. To support a charge 
of Issuing a Bad Check, the State must establish that the defendant drafted a check for payment 
with the purpose of receiving something of value knowing that the check would not be honored 
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due to insufficient funds. The State supports its position based upon the insufficient funds. 
However, the State must establish that the checks were written for exchange of value. Issuing a 
check for exchange of value is an essential element that the State must satisfy. The State argued 
that something of value was exchanged because the elimination of debt should be considered 
value. This Court disagrees. The facts of the case clearly show that on July 17, 2002, when Mrs. 
Wallace wrote the checks, neither Mr. Martinez or Horton were given any new value to the 
defendants. See Howell Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). It was nothing more than a 
promise to pay in the future, without adding new or additional terms to previous agreement that 
arose from the July 2, 2001 transactions. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 is 
granted. 
II. Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft bv Deception, is dismissed because the 
State fails to establish misrepresentation by Mrs. Wallace, nor does the State establish 
actual deception by Mr. Wallace. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 2, Issuing a Bad Check, and George Wallace is 
charged with Count 7, Theft by Deception, for events arising out of checks that were written by 
Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel. The Defendant argues that because Murdock Travel 
agreed to withhold depositing the check for a few days that the check falls out of the definition of 
a check, which must be payable on demand, and that it should be regarded as only a promise to 
pay in the future. The Defendant cites State v. Bruce. 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953) in support of her 
position. In Bruce, the Utah Supreme Court stated that postdated checks did not fall under the 
bad check statute, however, the statute applied if there was misrepresentation made at the time 
the check was written. This Court finds that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to 
establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of misrepresentation. 
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the defendant wrote the 
checks with the knowledge that there would be insufficient funds based upon the Wallaces' 
history of debt. However, there was ample testimony at the preliminary hearing that the 
Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and 
there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant does 
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not carry the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather 
this burden rests solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's were 
engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money 
arriving from a business deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces 
were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds. The 
State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of receiving money was a 
misrepresentation and the State can not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of 
insufficient funds and a failure to pay. 
Moreover, as pertaining to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State is required to establish 
some evidence that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that is false, 
fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct 
that is not true, or promises performances that he does not intend to preform. Here, the State has 
failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact 
that Morris Travel would be repaid. The evidence at the preliminary hearing established that Ms. 
Warner, an employee of Murdock Travel, dealt exclusively with the Defendant's wife and not the 
Defendant. Therefore, since the State is unable to satisfy all elements of the charges, the 
defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 7 is granted. 
III. COUNT 3 & 8. Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State failed to establish 
that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to defraud the Fauxs of at least $5,000. 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of dealings with the Fauxs. To bind over for a charge of Communication 
Fraud, a second degree felony, the State must establish that the defendants devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud another of at least $5,000 or something other than monetary value, and that the 
events occurred in Utah County, Utah. The State contends that the Fauxs were defrauded out of 
$7,286.83. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that in Utah County the following 
debts were made by Mrs. Wallace: $1,129.32 of which Deborah borrowed from Mrs. Faux to pay 
for her son's rent-a-car, and for $1,063 in wages for Mrs. Faux's employment as a housekeeper in 
Springville, Utah. However, based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, the 
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remaining transactions all occurred in Hawaii and not in Utah County, Utah and therefore those 
transactions can not be calculated in the total figure to establish communication fraud. 
Therefore, since the monetary value that was accrued in Utah County, Utah does not exceed 
$5,000 the State is unable to establish probable cause as to all elements of the charge. 
In addition, this Court finds that the debt that accrued in Utah County, Utah does not 
amount to communication fraud. Based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, 
it was established that on previous occasions that the defendants did repay money on previous 
loans they owed the Fauxs, which is contrary to the State's position. Moreover, no testimony 
was presented at the Preliminary Hearing to show that the Wallaces' expectation of funding was 
fraudulent. Since intent to defraud is an essential element of Communication Fraud, and the 
State failed to satisfy this element, this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts 3 
and 8, Communication Fraud. 
IV COUNT 4 & 10, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State has failed to 
establish that the delinquent mortgage and tax payments was an intent to defraud the 
Stonelys. 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. To bindover a 
communication fraud the State must satisfy its burden by presenting some evidence of a scheme 
or artifice to defraud another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises 
or material omissions. However, the State supports its position by claiming that delinquent 
payments is sufficient to establish communication fraud and that the defendants were spending 
money to finish the basement instead of paying their other debts. These assertions are not 
sufficient to satisfy the State's burden. The State fails to present any evidence of a scheme or 
artifice. Moreover, delinquent payments are not sufficient to establish probable cause of an 
intent to defraud. Finally, this Court finds that the fact that the Stonelys executed and recorded, 
through their attorney, a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all obligations owed by the 
Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's position that the Wallaces intended to defraud 
the Stonelys. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 10 is granted. 
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V. Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful activity, are dismissed because the Wallaces do not 
constitute an enterprise, nor does their conduct constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as 
defined bv statute. 
Both defendants are charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity. To bind over Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, the State must establish that probable cause exist that the Wallaces constitutes 
an enterprise and of a pattern of unlawful activity. An "enterprise" means any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities." U.C.A. section 76-10-1602(1). The State contends that the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise under the statute, but the State fails to articulate how the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise, other than the mere fact that they are married to each. The State failed to 
present any evidence or authority to establish that a married couple constitutes an enterprise as 
defined by the statute. In a recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals states that "[a]n 'association 
in fact' enterprise 'is provided by evidence of an ongoing organization formal or informal, and by 
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.5" State v. Bradshaw. 508 
Utah.Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 2004)(citations omitted). An enterprise is a "continuing unit 
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." State v. McGrath. 749 P.2d 631 
(Utah App. 1988)(stating that the individuals had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose 
of making money with the sale of drugs). The State cites no authority suggesting that marriage 
creates an enterprise. Courts have universally rejected attempts to extend the scope of 
antiracketeering laws and to reject efforts "to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in 
RICO clothing." Bradshaw. 508 Utah.Adv. Rep at 16. This Court finds that the mere fact that 
the Wallaces are married does not constitute an enterprise. It is the conclusion of this Court that 
it was not the legislative intent to include marriages as an enterprise within the scope of the 
statute scheme to constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as contemplate in U.C.A. section 76-
10-1602(1). 
Furthermore, the Wallaces pattern of debt does not constitute unlawful pattern of activity 
as described by the statute. The statute requires at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but are the same or similar. Such activities that are prohibited 
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are theft by deception or communication fraud. However, as stated previously, this Court finds 
that the conduct of the Wallaces do not amount to acts of either commercial fraud or theft by 
deception. Moreover, this Court finds that the defendants did not use or invest the money they 
borrowed in a proscribed manner, as required by the statute. The "language of the statute is clear 
that defendants] must 'use or invest5 the proceeds from the unlawful activity in the proscribed 
manner, namely the 'acquisition,' 'establishment,' or 'operation of an 'enterprise.'" Id.; See 
State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988)("[UPUAA} makes it a crime to use the profits 
of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise."); and Accord State v. 
Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)("A [RICO} violation occurs not when the 
defendant engages in the predicate acts, but only when he uses or invests the proceeds of that 
activity in an enterprise.'")(citation omitted). 
Therefore, this Court grants the Defendants motion to dismiss Counts 5 and 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity. 
VI COUNT 6, Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the State failed to show actual 
deception by the defendant when he persuaded Mr. Horton to loan him $10,000. 
Theft by deception requires that the State prove the defendant created or confirmed by 
words or conduct a fact that is false, fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created 
or confirmed by words or conduct that is not true, or promises performances that he does not 
intend to preform. The State contends that Mr. Wallace committed a theft by deception by 
entering into an agreement to have Mr. Horton make an investment of $10,000, without 
intending to repay him. However, the only evidence the State presents to support its contention 
is the defendant's failure to repay. The State did not provide any evidence regarding the nature 
of the investment and whether the investment was fraudulent. There was no evidence presented 
to establish whether there was either a fictitious investment project or whether the money was 
actually invested but that the project failed to perform as had been expected by the Defendant. 
The fact that the money was not repaid is insufficient to establish an intent to deceive; the State 
must present some evidence that a "big deal" was not legitimately expected by the defendant and 
that the lack of repayment was not a result of commercial misfortune. Furthermore, there was 
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testimony presented that the agreement between the defendant and Mr. Horton took place 
simultaneously when the defendant and Mr. Martinez entered into the identical agreement. Mr. 
Martinez received full repayment of the loan's principal which supports the position that the 
defendant possessed the intent to repay, rather than to deceive. In addition, there was evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing that there had been a history of paying debts to Mr. 
Martinez. 
The State failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false 
impression of fact that Mr. Horton would be repaid. Not every unfilled promise is turned into 
deception. State v. Lakev, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983). A lack of repayment is insufficient 
to establish probable cause that the defendant intended to defraud either Mr. Horton or Mr. 
Martinez. This Court finds that there lacks probable cause to bindover Count 6 and that this 
charge is dismissed. 
VII The State fails to provide sufficient facts for Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check. 
This issue was not raised in either the State's or the Defendant's motion, nor was it 
discussed in oral arguments. Since this Court was not given sufficient facts to determine the 
nature of this charge, Count 9 is dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence presented to the Court at the Preliminary Hearing; Oral Arguments 
and Memorandums, this Court finds that the State has been unable to establish probable cause for 
each and every element of the charges. Moreover, this Court finds that the State failed to meet its 
burden to show that the defendants conduct raised to the level of theft and fraud, rather than mere 
commercial misfortune. Therefore this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss all 
counts. The Defendants are to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
On a final note, it appears, based upon the facts of this case and the arguments presented 
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by the State, that the State is making the statement that there should be a policy to criminally 
charge individuals who run into financial difficulties, are unable to pay debts, file for bankruptcy, 
have foreclosed on their mortgage, or who fail to meet their contractual obligations, and that 
these debtors should be subject to criminal sanctions, along with any potential civil actions. In 
these situations, there are often a multitude of unpaid debts to various creditors, however, it is 
clear that the criminal courts are not the proper avenue to deal with these situations, nor should 
they be used to convert ordinary civil debt into criminal restitution. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
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CASENOS. 031403946, 031403948 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
These matters came before the Court for preliminary hearing on April 7,2004. 
Present were Dave Wayment appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, Gunda Jarvis on behalf 
of George Wallace ("George"), and Jennifer Go wans on behalf of Deborah Wallace 
("Deborah"). The Court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to 
brief issues relative to the bind-over. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on 
November 30, 2004, wherein it found that all charges should be dismissed because the 
State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing, to wit: 
Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check: The State failed to present any evidence that 
Deborah drafted a check for payment with the purpose of receiving something 
of value, or that she did so knowing that the check would not be honored due to 
insufficient funds. 
Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception: Relative to 
Count 2, the State failed to present any evidence of fraudulent intent when 
Deborah instructed Morris Murdock Travel's agent to hold the check for a 
period of time until sufficient funds were deposited into the account. 
As to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State failed to establish any 
evidence that George created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that was 
false, or that he failed to correct a false impression that he created or confirmed 
by words or conduct that was not true, or that he promised performance that he 
did not intend to perform. Moreover, the evidence established that Ms. Warner 
dealt exclusively with Deborah. 
Counts 3 & 8, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, because the 
monetary value that accrued in Utah was less than $5,000, the State is unable as 
a matter of law to meet the value element of these charges. Further, the State 
presented no evidence that the Defendants' communications were made with 
any intent to defraud, or that the Wallaces engaged in a scheme or artifice. To 
the contrary, Ms. Faux testified that she believed the Defendants acted in good 
faith and were simply unable to meet their financial obligations due to 
unforeseen economic hardship. 
Counts 4 & 10, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, the State 
has failed to establish any evidence of a scheme or artifice to defraud or to 
obtain anything of value. Further, the undisputed fact that the Stonelys 
executed and recorded a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all 
obligations owed by the Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's 
position that the Wallaces intended to defraud the Stonelys, or that the Wallaces 
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engaged in a scheme or artifice, or that they received anything of value. 
Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful Activitv: The State has failed to establish 
any evidence or cite to any authority that the Wallaces are an enterprise or that 
their conduct constituted a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by statute. 
The mere fact that the Wallaces are married is not sufficient to establish an 
enterprise within the scope contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(1). 
Furthermore, the Wallaces' pattern of debt does not constitute a pattern of 
unlawful activity as defined by the controlling statute; nor does it arise to the 
level of criminal conduct, as previously noted herein. Moreover, the State has 
completely failed to present any evidence that the defendants used or invested 
the proceeds from the alleged illegal activity for the acquisition, establishment, 
or operation of an enterprise. 
Count 6, Theft by Deception: The State has failed to establish any evidence 
that George had any intent to deceive Mr. Horton, or that George created, 
confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact regarding repayment, or 
that the failure to repay was anything more than commercial misfortune. 
Rather, the evidence showed that George intended to repay the loan. The mere 
lack of repayment is insufficient to establish probable cause as to the essential 
element of intent to defraud. 
Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check: This issue was not raised in either the State's 
or the Defendant's motion, and was not discussed at oral arguments. The Court 
was not given sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge. 
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In summary, each of the State's creditor-witnesses testified that the Wallaces 
were expecting a large sum of money with which to pay all their debts. There was no 
testimony or inference that this expectation was a misrepresentation. To the contrary, the 
State's evidence includes that the Wallaces have a history of repaying their debts, they 
signed a warranty deed returning residential property to the sellers after the Wallaces 
made improvements, and that the Wallaces acted in good faith. None of the State's 
witnesses testified that the Wallaces intended to defraud anyone, nor can the same be 
inferred in light of the substantial evidence to the contrary. In short, this case represents 
an improper attempt to use the criminal justice system as a means to collect a civil debt. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that ail the charges in the Information 
are hereby dismissed. 
BY THE COURT this 31 day of January, 2005. 
^uL '•• * 
Judge Steven L -^^ Uc^eiL^Sgu^^ / 0 M^~< 
° \ i / 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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